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Jakob von Uexküll’s (1864-1944) account of Umwelt has been proposed as 
a mediating concept to bridge the gap between ecological psychology’s 
realism about environmental information and enactivism’s emphasis on the 
organism’s active role in constructing the meaningful world it inhabits. If 
successful, this move would constitute a significant step towards establishing 
a single ecological-enactive framework for cognitive science.1 However, 
Uexküll’s thought itself contains different perspectives that are in tension 
with each other, and the concept of Umwelt is developed in representationalist 
terms that conflict with the commitments of both enactivism and ecological 
psychology.2 One central issue shared by all these approaches is the problem 
of how a living being experiences its environment. In this paper, we will look 
at Uexküll’s reception in French philosophy and highlight the different ways 
in which the concept of Umwelt functions in the work of Georges Canguilhem, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gilles Deleuze. This analysis helps to clarify 
different aspects of Uexküll’s thought and the deeper philosophical 
implications of importing his concepts into embodied cognitive science. This 
paper is part of a recent trend in which enactivism engages with continental 
philosophy in a way that both deepens and transcends the traditional links to 
phenomenology, including most recently the thought of Georg W. F. Hegel 
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and Gilbert Simondon.3 However, no more than a brief outline and 
introduction to the potentials and challenges of this complex conceptual 
intersection can be given here. Our hope is that it serves to make more explicit 
the philosophical issues that are at stake for cognitive science in the question 
of experienced environments, while charting a useful course for future 
research.4 
The different approaches to embodied cognition that have gained 
increasing popularity since the 1990s form a loose coalition of research 
projects and employ a daunting range of theoretical and philosophical 
resources, from robotics and dynamical systems theory to elements of 
Buddhist philosophy and phenomenology. This plurality of perspectives and 
conceptual toolsets accounts for the fecundity of embodiment as an approach 
to cognitive science, but in turn constitutes one of the central challenges for 
the unification of embodied cognition as one coherent paradigm that could 
hope to unseat classical cognitivism as the dominant framework for the 
scientific study of the mind.  
From amongst the different tendencies labeled as 4EA—embodied, 
embedded, extended, enactive, and affective—, a sizeable portion of the field 
seems to have clustered around just two major perspectives: ecological 
psychology and enactivism. They share a strong emphasis on dynamical 
systems theory (DST) as a main mathematical tool for modelling the relevant 
material and cognitive processes, and both recognize phenomenology as an 
important precursor to their philosophical commitment to the scale of a living 
subject and its experience, as opposed to the abstract algorithmic approach of 
traditional symbol processing models.5 Despite the similarities between these 
two perspectives, they have until recently kept at a critical distance from each 
other.  
Their mutual skepticism concerns the different emphasis each side puts 
on the two poles of an animal-environment system: ecological psychology6, 
and its subsequent development into radical embodied cognitive science7, is 
committed to explaining the cognitive behavior of agents as driven primarily 
by their environments. The objective features of the material world afford 
different actions to different agents, and this information about which 
features afford what to which agents is fully present in the physical properties 
of light, sound, and other modalities of perception.8 This way, ecological 
psychology has no need for an internal subject that generates meaning from 
stimuli, creating an internal representation of a world that is accessible only 
indirectly through a small set of fragmented impressions. Instead, perception 
is direct, the world is its own best model, and the privileged subject that 
Western thought inherited from Descartes and Kant is demoted to one of 
many coupled elements within a complex cognitive system that encompasses 
organisms and environment. The patterns of cognitive behavior and their 
change over time are explained as emergent phenomena and predicted via 
DST—as Gibson9 put it: behavior is regular, without being regulated. 
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In contrast, enactivism emphasizes how the behavior of an organism—
and ultimately its very existence—is a self-organized process in service of 
continuously producing itself.10 A central source of the enactivist perspective 
is the theory of autopoiesis, which explains the continued existence of 
organisms over time as the ongoing self-production of a system of mutually 
constraining and enabling processes. The original formulation by Maturana 
and Varela11 can be traced back to Kant’s12 account of the organism as a whole 
in which the parts all cause each other. But where Kant understood our 
ascription of purpose to a self-organizing system to be a merely a necessary 
conceptual tool in our understanding of living beings, enactivism treats the 
teleology of the organism as the central feature of its processual dynamics.13 
The original formulation of autopoiesis was criticized as describing a system 
that is both too static and too strongly walled-off from its environment to 
provide an accurate description of living organisms14, but subsequent 
developments explain organismic self-production as a dialectical process of 
maintaining its boundary towards the exterior on the one hand and opening 
itself to the influx of material and energetic resources in order to fuel its 
processes on the other.15 With this reformulation, the environment plays a 
constitutive role in the process of self-organization, yet the explanatory 
emphasis still clearly lies on the organism itself. It is the organism as a living 
subject that actively opens itself to the environment, and it does so in order to 
get the resources needed to maintain its closure. 
  Despite both analyzing cognition on the level of the animal-
environment system, and despite their shared rejection of classical 
cognitivism and its representationalist, dualist conception of the mind, 
enactivism and ecological psychology thus find themselves at odds over the 
question of which part takes primacy: the organism or its environment. 
Beyond the matter of explanatory emphasis, this contrast also expresses itself 
in terms of more metaphysical commitments and the respective qualms about 
the other side: ecological psychologists have been suspicious that enactivism’s 
view of the subject constructing a meaningful world for its own perception 
and action might amount to solipsism16, while enactivists fear that ecological 
psychology reduces the study of mind to a mathematical description of 
externally observable behavior, to the exclusion of cognizing agents and their 
subjective experience.17 
Recently, both sides have started to recognize the similarities and 
synergies between the two approaches to embodied cognition, with a shared 
desire to construct one single ecological-enactive approach that “promises 
perhaps the most complete alternative to cognitivism as a working 
metatheory for the study of minds.”18 Baggs and Chemero differentiate 
between the habitat of a species in which affordances are present as objective 
structures and the Umwelt of a single organism in which those structures 
become available to this particular subject. This move is meant to bridge the 
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gap between the realist environment of ecological psychology and the subject-
centered perspective of enactivism, moving the term Umwelt, coined by Jakob 
von Uexküll, from the margins of cognitive science where it has been present 
for decades into a central role for the further development of embodied 
cognition. In contrast, Fultot and Turvey19 point out that Umwelt involves a 
commitment to representationalism and dualism that is anathema to 
embodied cognition and instead propose Uexküll’s use of musical metaphors 
for the meaningful relationships between different organisms and their 
environment as a corollary of James J. Gibson’s20 account of this relation of 
reciprocity. However, Uexküll’s appeal to melody and harmony as the modes 
in which meaning is present in living nature comes with its own philosophical 
backdrop and in order to do conceptual work, the underlying assumptions 
and arguments have to be made explicit. 
 Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944) was a biologist who studied physiology 
and animal behavior and developed an idiosyncratic approach to the study of 
living beings that was heavily inflected by, and in turn influenced, 
philosophy. One of his central tenets was that organisms are not complex 
machines but living subjects, each of which inhabits its own phenomenal 
world called an Umwelt.21 The behavior of animals can be explained through 
the actions that are afforded to them by objects in their environment which 
are relevant to their skills and needs. In describing how perceptions and 
actions form functional cycles that regulate behavior, Uexküll anticipated 
central aspects of cybernetics. His thought was highly influential in ethology 
and ecology, and it inaugurated the field of biosemiotics.22 Today scholars in 
a wide range of fields read Uexküll, from cognitive science to animal studies 
and art theory.23 Uexküll understood his work as an explicit continuation of 
Kant’s account of the subject of experience, which he strove to deepen in terms 
of the role of the body for human subjectivity and amend by an account of 
animals as living subjects.24 
 Uexküll’s reception has been fraught with misreadings, many of which 
revolve around two questions: 
Do Umwelten exist for individual animals or whole species? 
Are Umwelten sets of elements selected from an objective 
material world, or are they mental constructions?   
Since Uexküll, the term Umwelt has mostly been used to describe merely the 
set of all relevant elements in the environment of an animal, omitting 
Uexküll’s central claim that each organism actively constructs its Umwelt.25 
Similarly, Umwelt is often used as if it concerns a whole species. Uexküll 
himself often wrote like this, especially in his early work Umwelt und Innenwelt 
der Tiere. Phrases like ‘the Umwelt of a tick’, refer to a kind of animal, not an 
individual, and this Umwelt is the environment of any and all ticks. Taken at 
face value, this reading is deflationary and omits the aspect of subjective 
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experience that is central for Uexküll’s conception: Each living organism has 
its own Umwelt, hence there are as many worlds as there are living beings. 
 Each organism perceives only those stimuli which it is attuned to by the 
configuration of its sensory organs and nervous system. Some read this to 
involve merely the selection of a subset of all features of the physical 
environment. However, Uexküll claims that the Umwelt which a living subject 
perceives and acts on is the result of a semiotic process in which physical 
stimuli are converted by the nervous system into signs of location, time, and 
different qualities, which are then synthesized into objects and transposed 
outwards so as to enable the experience of a spatial world. This is the source 
for Fultot and Turvey’s26 misgivings, which are not unjustified. Uexküll’s 
account of the subjective experience of animals is strongly grounded in 
Kant—albeit in an unorthodox way. Searching for the conditions of the 
possibility of perceiving three-dimensional space in the physiology of the 
semi-circular canals27 would be quite alien to Kant, for whom space is a pure 
form of sensible intuition that we know a priori. For Kant, no empirical 
discovery about organic bodies can fully account for space, because our 
apperception of the bodies themselves is already spatial, thus the form has to 
be accounted for before any empirical discoveries can be made.28 Uexküll may 
thus be too much of a Kantian for embodied cognition, but his thought is also 
too embodied for Kantian idealism.29 
 The alternative that Fultot and Turvey present is attractive: Uexküll 
describes how the web of a spider forms a counterpoint with the body of the 
fly, even before they ever encounter each other. In order to explain the 
manifold ways in which complex structures and processes fit neatly into each 
other in nature, Uexküll invokes a picturesque metaphorical formation of 
melody, harmony, and symphony. The musical language sounds good to an 
ecological psychologist’s ears, because they already work with a concept of 
resonance.30 However, there are important aspects to keep in mind: Uexküll 
introduces the symphony of life to explain the appearance of design in nature 
without having to appeal to Darwinian evolution. Ecological psychology 
already has an account of how variation and natural selection lead to the 
attunement of organisms to specific affordances, and it is at least surprising 
to introduce a second account of meaning in nature that was originally meant 
to be an alternative explanation. Moreover, the musical metaphor is grounded 
in a thoroughly romanticist version of holism: Uexküll’s central reference in 
Bedeutungslehre31 is to Goethe, whose work on morphology grounds this 
notion of an organization that realizes a meaningful plan according to a 
“biological archetype” and through a “process that is ideal rather than 
material.”32 Beyond Goethe, Uexküll’s musical theory of meaning also 
references Hans Driesch’s neo-vitalist embryology.33 For most of the 20th 
century, historians of science have largely shunned the influence of 
Kantianism, romanticism and vitalism on the morphogenesis of biology, 
based on the assumption that philosophies which clash with the hegemony of 
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analytical philosophy and reductive natural sciences can only have 
contributed negatively to the history of science. This dogma has been 
challenged and is beginning to crumble, opening up new areas of 
philosophical investigation that bear the potential for an actual philosophy of 
organismic life—a concern that has largely been crowded out by the 
identification of philosophy of biology with philosophy of evolutionary 
theory.  
However, importing new concepts into the philosophy of cognitive 
science should be done with a full understanding of the assumptions that give 
them traction and the implications that go along with endorsing them. In the 
case of Uexküll, the history of his reception in France is particularly 
instructive, partly because Merleau-Ponty functions as its conceptual fulcrum 
and his thought is already firmly entrenched in the philosophy of embodied 
cognition. The most important figures in the francophone reception of 
Uexküll are Georges Canguilhem, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gilles 
Deleuze. In the following sections we aim to show that their work often 
engages the same problems encountered by the ecological-enactive approach, 
that Uexküll’s thought plays an important role at key junctures, and that the 
different philosophical perspectives of these thinkers allow us to reconceive 
existing theoretical problems in productive ways—but not without 
introducing new conceptual challenges of their own. 
Georges Canguilhem and the Vital Normativity of Umwelt 
As a philosopher of science and in particular through his critical analysis 
of medicine and biology, Georges Canguilhem had a deep influence on a 
whole generation of French intellectuals.34 His conceptual history of Umwelt 
in “The Living and its Milieu”35 introduced the term to a wide audience of 
francophone philosophers and his work on different forms of vitalism, 
organisms and machines, as well as his seminal work on pathology set the 
stage for the discussion in France of a range of topics that informed both 
Uexküll’s own work and its subsequent developments in the work of other 
thinkers.  
Canguilhem’s reconceptualization of health and sickness in The Normal 
and the Pathological36 advanced a trenchant critique of the dominant notions of 
pathology that classified individual organisms as pathological based on a 
numerical deviation from some preestablished norm defined by the average 
of a measured value. In contrast to this, Canguilhem developed a notion of 
health that is centered on the ability of the living organism to establish its own 
vital norms: “an organism's norm of life is furnished by the organism itself, 
contained in its existence.”37 Vital norms are relations of meaning between the 
organism and its environment that determine the valence of perceived objects 
and events, as well as the cycles of action-perception that accord to them: “In 
this sense the organism is not thrown into an environment to which he must 
submit, but he structures his environment at the same time that he develops 
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his capacities as an organism.”38 The setting of vital norms is not a conscious 
activity of the organism but a deeper, underlying mode of relating to itself 
and its environment that forms the basis of both experience and behavior. This 
process is the organism’s construction or enaction of its own Umwelt, and seen 
from this angle it appears to precede behavior and experience logically 
and/or temporally. However, there is in practice no abstract Umwelt that 
exists independently of action-perception, and the emergence of affordances 
in the subject’s experience is coupled in a circular manner with the organismic 
needs that precede it and the actions that resolve both the need and the 
valence of the object that is acted on.  
Although the organism gives itself these vital norms, they are far from 
arbitrary. Instead, their form and content are constrained by the organism’s 
material environment and its metabolic needs. Pathology under this 
conception consists in the organism’s inability to set new vital norms for itself 
in accordance with a changed environment or a change in its own 
organization. This pathology is a kind of inflexibility, a rigidity of its vital 
norms that reduce the organism’s ability to adapt. Pathology is a reduction of 
the organism’s Umwelt. Health conversely consists in a greater range of 
possible vital norms that the organism can enact, an expansion of its Umwelt. 
An organism’s health and the richness of its Umwelt conform with the extent 
of its “needful freedom.”39 The grounding of the phenomenal subject and the 
world it experiences in material organismic processes counters the charges of 
idealism that have been levelled against the strong Kantian version of Umwelt 
at least since Helmuth Plessner’s Levels of Organic Life and the Human40 and 
against enactivism’s roots in autopoiesis.41 Umwelten are not the arbitrary 
mental inventions of abstract, disembodied subjects, they arise from the 
organismic activity of living organisms and are constrained by their metabolic 
needs and their material environment.  
Canguilhem’s reception of Uexküll owes some of its potency to Kurt 
Goldstein’s discussion of Umwelt and pathology in The Organism: A Holistic 
Approach to Biology Derived from Pathological Data in Man.42 Indeed, Augustín 
Ostachuk deems it “probable that Canguilhem was first acquainted with 
Uexküll’s theories through Goldstein.”43 Having treated many patients with 
nervous illnesses and deep trauma after the First World War, Goldstein was 
convinced that organismic health can only be assessed holistically, on the 
level of the living subject and its behavior in its environment. Despite his 
criticism of some aspects of Uexküll, Goldstein’s adoption of fundamental 
tenets of Umwelt thought proved critical for Uexküll’s reception by both 
Canguilhem and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, Goldstein’s criticism of 
Uexküll is not that humans occupy a special position in (or outside of) nature 
that frees them from the constraints of Umwelt. This form of human 
exceptionalism was the common denominator of the reactions to Uexküll both 
in philosophical anthropology (most importantly Max Scheler and Helmuth 
Plessner) and its rival Martin Heidegger. In contrast, the French reception of 
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Uexküll by and large discussed the Umwelten of animals and humans on a 
continuum.44 Canguilhem’s emphasis on how an organism constitutes itself 
as a living subject and enacts its Umwelt at the same time wards off both 
charges of idealism and the temptation of making an exception for humans: 
Our cognition and behavior are aspects of our organismic activity just as they 
are for any other animal and the worlds of our experience arise from the same 
kind of material processes. 
 The two main take-aways for how Umwelt figures in contemporary 
debates at the interface of enactivism and ecological psychology are these: 1) 
an organism setting its own vital norms and enacting its Umwelt does not 
engender idealism and 2) there is no special exception for human animals and 
their Umwelten. 
 
The Openness of Umwelt in Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological psychology is one of the most 
important sources for embodied cognition in general, and especially for 
enactivism.45 Even though most of Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with 
Uexküll takes place after his “ontological turn”, references to the Estonian 
ethologist are already present in The Structure of Behavior.46 But the influence 
of the Umwelt seems to reach even further back in the history of 
phenomenology. When Husserl develops his notion of Lebenswelt in his Ideen 
zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (1913), he 
uses the term Umwelt.47 Dermot Moran emphasizes the significance of “’the 
natural surrounding world’ (die natürliche Umwelt), which eventually evolved 
into the notion of the ‘life-world’ (Lebenswelt) in Husserl’s Freiburg era.”48 
Although Moran suggests that this might show the influence of Uexküll on 
Husserl’s thought, he does not investigate further. Similarly, Tønnessen et al. 
discuss Husserl’s use of Umwelt as if it is identical with the Uexküllian 
concept, without making explicit arguments for this assumption.49 This is a 
plausible assumption, but if it is true, it is also an important point about the 
history of phenomenology: Is this merely a strong conceptual affinity or did 
Uexküll’s theory of animal experience significantly influence Husserl’s 
inauguration of phenomenology as a philosophical program? The question 
cannot be answered here, but its importance is clear. 
Throughout his writings, Merleau-Ponty’s views are strongly influenced 
by Husserl, especially Husserl’s distinction between Körper and Leib, and his 
concept of the Ineinander. In his later work, Merleau-Ponty moves from a 
phenomenological analysis of our conscious experience towards the 
development of an ontological account of nature, as being composed of what 
he called variably ‘corporeality’, ‘flesh’, or ‘chiasm’.50 His rethinking of the 
body is called a chiasm because it constitutes a “crossing-over […] which 
combines subjective experience and objective existence” and highlights “the 
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ambiguous status of our bodies as both subject and object.”51 He thought that 
the “problems posed in [the Phenomenology of Perception] are insoluble because 
[he started] there from the ‘consciousness’-‘object’ distinction,”52 and 
attempted to bring the results of his earlier work to “ontological 
explication.”53 Much of Merleau-Ponty’s late work is only available to us in 
the form of lecture transcripts, working notes, and unfinished manuscripts. 
However, the importance of Uexküll’s thought in it is clear. Indeed, his 
lectures include extensive comments on Uexküll’s writings. Especially the 
concept of Umwelt plays a crucial role in the discussion of “the subject-object 
question, the question of inter-subjectivity, the question of Nature.”54  
Throughout the “Working Notes” included in the texts published as The 
Visible and the Invisible, the openness of the Umwelt reappears like a refrain 
and is even offered as “[t]he true solution: Offenheit of the Umwelt, 
Horizonhaftigkeit. [sic]”55.  
It is the very structure of a horizon— but it is evident that 
this structure means nothing in the in itself— that it has 
meaning only in the Umwelt of a carnal subject, as Offenheit, 
as Verborgenheit of Being.56 
This use of Umwelt informs central aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology: “This 
that-is-openness to things, with participation on their part, or which carries 
them in its circuit, is properly the flesh.”57 The somewhat arcane formulations 
from the Working Notes are echoed more clearly in “Nature and Logos”: “We 
are not dealing here with two natures, […] but with a double nature. The 
themes of the Umwelt, […] of perception as true mobility (Sichbewegen), […] 
all express the idea of corporeality as an entity with two faces or two ‘sides’. 
[…] The body proper embraces a philosophy of the flesh as the visibility of 
the invisible.”58 It is worth pointing out that, decades later, Gibson mirrors 
Merleau-Ponty’s description in his initial discussion of what he calls 
‘affordances’:   
But, actually, an affordance is neither an objective property 
nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An 
affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-
objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is 
equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It 
is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance 
points both ways, to the environment and to the observer.59 
Just as Merleau-Ponty’s corporeality and Gibson’s affordances have 
double natures, Uexküll’s Umwelt also has two sides in its ethological and 
phenomenological facets. From the inside, it is the perspective of the subject 
experiencing its world, but from the outside it is the milieu of behavior 
observable by the scientist. “[T]his chiasm is the philosophical payoff of 
Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Uexküll’s work.”60 
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At the end of his essay “Limits of Phenomenology,” Merleau-Ponty 
contrasts the view from nowhere with the embodied positionality of the 
phenomenal subject: When “I adopt the Copernican constitution of the world, 
I abandon my own standpoint, I pretend to be an absolute observer […] and I 
come to consider the world as the pure object on an infinite reflection.”61 
Merleau-Ponty contrasts to this the “type of being which our experience of 
the earth and the body reveals to us, [which] contains a philosophy of the 
world as Offenheit der Umwelt, in opposition to the ‘represented’ infinite of 
the classical sciences of nature.”62  The Offenheit of the Umwelt is non-finite, 
but at the same time is not infinite. Merleau-Ponty contrasts two notions of 
the non-finite: “Offenheit of the Umwelt and not Unendlichkeit [infinity] ------ 
[…] For me the infinity of Being that one can speak of is operative, militant 
finitude: the openness of the Umwelt.”63 Just as Gibson’s work mirrors 
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the Umwelt, so too does Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch’s recipe for enactivist cognitive science,64 which must begin by rejecting 
the God’s-eye view of traditional scientific approaches, lest it fail to account 
for human experience. 
In his excellent commentary on Merleau-Ponty’s use of Uexküll’s ideas, 
Pearson notes that:  
Merleau-Ponty draws upon these revolutions in biology, as 
well as Uexküll's work on the ethology of Umwelten which 
shows the extent to which the 'environment' is structured 
and mediated by the specific Umwelt of the organism, in 
order to dispel the idea that life is simply an 'object' for a 
'consciousness'. Such an insight, he claims, marks the point 
at which phenomenology breaks with idealism.65 
At this point the conceptual work necessary for an ecological-enactive 
approach to cognitive science overlaps with Merleau-Ponty’s project. If the 
nature of this break with idealism afforded by Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of 
the Offenheit of the Umwelt could be clarified and its logic rendered in the 
language of embodied cognition, it might take us some way towards 
reconciling ecological psychology and enactivist approaches in the cognitive 
sciences, both of which bear Merleau-Ponty’s influence. However, just as 
Merleau-Ponty’s late work is fragmentary and unfinished, our analysis so far 
only helps us to see what kind of conceptual work is necessary to ground an 
ecological-enactive paradigm—this work then still needs to be done. 
Gilles Deleuze’s Spinozian-Uexküll harmony 
        After a long philosophical look at Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) in his 
book Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) concludes: “we 
are in the middle of Spinoza.”66 This claim needs unpacking. Deleuze refers to 
‘we,’ as in all of us, moving in the plane of immanence (plan d'immanence). After 
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a Spinozian infused philosophy, we now must understand that our realities 
are shaped and continue in ‘the middle’ of an active world, and this ‘world of 
immanence’ should be the focus of any inquiries into life, giving up any false 
leads of transcendental philosophy. Indeed, the ‘practical philosophy’ of 
Spinoza will become the cornerstone of Deleuze’s whole milieu, but not 
without invoking the work of Uexküll in that same text. 
        Before we get to Uexküll, it should be emphasized that Deleuze’s 
treatment of Spinoza’s ‘practical philosophy’ has gotten us in the middle of a 
bunch of Spinozian ideas concerning existence, nature, immanence, affect, 
mind and body parallelism, and more. It is as if Deleuze is tuning those 
instruments as a prelude to his own later philosophical enterprises – 
especially his collaborations with Félix Guattari (1930-1992). Furthermore, 
being in the middle of Spinoza is where Deleuze gets his nails for sealing the 
coffin of the Cartesian project. But an important methodological point should 
be realized here. While Deleuze does consider Spinoza the key thinker for his 
project, he does not create an orthodoxy of Spinozian ideas. Rather Deleuze’s 
method is to use them as a set of openings for his own ideas to grow from. 
These ideas are like melodies which he recombines and builds into more 
complex harmonies. Deleuze builds a harmony of ideas by combining 
Spinoza and Uexküll into his description of experience in the world. 
        Deleuze’s ‘Spinoza moment’ (or melody) is a key moment for his 
unravelling of the concept of experience. His Spinoza book is a dress rehearsal 
of thinking through Spinoza and, as he says, ‘getting us in the middle.’  Even 
if this thinking is far from the radical method and style of his collaboration 
with Félix Guattari in the two volume Capitalism and Schizophrenia, it is indeed 
the precursor to many points in the especially influential second volume, A 
Thousand Plateaus. 
        Deleuze’s Uexküll moment perhaps offers a key to his thinking. While 
arriving at the end of the text, and seemingly an afterthought, Uexküll’s work 
is cited and expanded upon by Deleuze in chapter six ‘Spinoza and Us.’67 In 
hindsight we now see this not as an afterthought, but as an opening – or a 
harmony added to his Spinozian melody. Furthermore, this Uexküll moment 
in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy is a few years later revisited in a very similar 
way in content and use in A Thousand Plateaus.68 We should note that by the 
time of this second go round with Uexküll’s work, Deleuze, now with 
Guattari, deploys those ideas within the context of his ‘post-structuralist’ 
(nomadologic and rhizomatic) project. 
        If at the end of the day Deleuze asks philosophy to work, to do, then 
we have an example of this not only in his putting to work of Spinoza, but in 
the same text in an encounter with Uexküll. These two thinkers form a 
harmony at the end of Deleuze’s text on Spinoza that resonates in repetition 
when integrated into A Thousand Plateaus. Given the scope of this essay we 
will overemphasize Deleuze’s integration of Uexküll’s ideas into his 
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‘Spinozian project’, then see how the incorporation of Uexküll into his project 
leads to several new ‘melodies’ of thinking. 
        If Deleuze’s project to rethink experience and the subject can be 
identified with anyone, it would be Spinoza. However, as we just noted, 
Uexküll should perhaps be elevated in our assessment of the Deleuzian / 
Deleuze-Guattarian project. As Felice Cimatti rightly notes: “…Deleuze and 
Guattari find in Uexküll the right tools to radically subvert Western 
metaphysics.”69 How does this integration of Spinozian ideas with Uexküll 
work? Let us start with Deleuze’s important text on Spinoza, where he builds 
the case for ‘being in the middle’ of the Spinozian universe, and eventually 
add Uexküll, who completes the openings in theories of experience and the 
subject provided by Spinoza. 
        In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze argues that Spinozist ethics 
have “nothing to do with a morality” but constitute an ethology.70 This view 
is developed by reading Spinoza through Uexküll and reading Uexküll 
through Spinoza. Like others before him, Deleuze affirms that Uexküll’s 
ethological “approach is no less valid for us, for human beings, than for 
animals,” but in radical departure from other readings of Uexküll, Deleuze 
uses the musical metaphor from Bedeutungslehre in order to mount an attack 
on the privileged place of the subject in our understanding of behavior.71 His 
reading of Uexküll as Spinozist takes the concept of Umwelt and follows it 
along a ‘line of flight’ to a place where it becomes other than itself. Remember 
that Deleuze is interested in the Umwelt as a biological world which bypasses 
the traditional subject–object or Cartesian divide. In addition, it helps explain 
what a body or organism can do. The plane of immanence is one of possibilities 
and this is the match he was looking for to describe his shaking of traditional 
western metaphysics. 
        More specifically Deleuze’s ‘line of flight’ can be reconstructed thus: 
He moves from describing a single organism and its environment to the ways 
several organisms relate to each other: “It is no longer a matter of utilizations 
or captures, but of sociabilities and communities. How do individuals enter 
into composition with one another in order to form a higher individual, ad 
infinitum? How can a being take another being into its world, but while 
preserving or respecting the other's own relations and world?”72 These 
questions seem to offer two distinct, even contrary models of how organisms 
relate to each other. The latter is close to an orthodox view of Umwelt but 
amended by a notion of what we might call an ‘ontologically respectful 
intersubjectivity.’ The former presents unbridled organicism, with 
individuals being subsumed as mere parts into higher-level wholes in a series 
that only stops at Nature, “the fullest and most intense Individual.”73 
       Deleuze identifies this second step as the outcome of Uexküll’s 
Bedeutungslehre: “Uexküll […] is a Spinozist when first he defines the melodic 
lines or contrapuntal relations that correspond to each thing, and then 
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describes a symphony as an immanent higher unity.”74 It should be noted that 
this concept of a higher unity that assigns the individual organisms their place 
in an overarching structure of meaning is problematic when considered in 
light of Uexküll’s organicist attack on liberal democracy in Staatsbiologie 
(1920), republished in 1933 under the Nazi regime, which implemented this 
“higher unity” in a deeply racist ethnic community and a totalitarian, 
genocidal state apparatus.75 
        Leaving that aside, Deleuze affirms the primacy of what ecological 
psychology calls the animal-environment system in a language borrowed 
from Uexküll’s musical metaphor and his adoption of Goethean morphology: 
“Every point has its counterpoints: the plant and the rain, the spider and the 
fly. So an animal, a thing, is never separable from its relations with the 
world.”76  This literary line of flight serves to move our thoughts to a new 
conception of Umwelt needed for Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadological and 
rhizomatic project. That value here is to understand that Deleuze’s Uexküll 
work with Spinoza creates a project which is connected to a contemporary 
dissolution of the Cartesian subject in embodied cognition. 
        Further evidence is visible in how Deleuze’s Uexküll connects to 
Merleau-Ponty. Deleuze states: “The interior is only a selected exterior, and 
the exterior, a projected interior.”77 The way this statement is phrased is 
deeply related to both Uexküll and Merleau-Ponty. It echoes a point by 
Merleau-Ponty that has become a cornerstone of how enactivists conceive the 
animal-environment system: “The world is inseparable from the subject, but 
from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is 
inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself 
projects.”78 The terms “selected” and “projected” take up the two main 
competing readings of Uexküll’s Umwelt and link them in the form of a 
chiasm, a concept that takes on central importance in Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontological work. 
        Returning to Deleuze’s Spinozian-Uexküll harmony, we must state 
simply that putting Uexküll in the middle of Spinoza is an important 
development in Deleuze’s thinking. It allows him to explore the biological 
plane of immanence (rather than transcendentalisms), overcome the subject-
object Cartesian subject, and describe how bodies live and change in the 
world. This project’s relation to embodied cognition comes from those 
trajectories and combinations which result in Deleuze proposing new 
descriptions of subjects and experience—establishing Uexküll as Spinozian, 
then making Uexküll Deleuzian. He does this by working out the importance 
of Uexküll’s thought as an immanent philosophy, costing us any transcendent 
elements in philosophy. This creates new ‘melodies’ or variations from the 
fundamental ideas of a Spinozian-Uexküllian spine of thought. 
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        Making Uexküll Deleuzian comes with consequences and 
compromises. The new ways to interpret Uexküll’s ideas all relate back to 
Deleuze / Deleuze-Guattari’s demand for immanence. As Deleuze puts it: 
“What is involved is no longer the affirmation of a single substance, but rather 
the laying out of a common plane of immanence on which all bodies, all 
minds, and all individuals are situated. This plane of immanence or 
consistency is a plan, but not in the sense of a mental design, a project, a 
program; it is a plan in the geometric sense: a section, an intersection, a 
diagram.”79 Or perhaps we can think of immanence as both a ‘plan’ and/or 
‘plane,’ given the brilliant note regarding the translation from the French to 
English from Robert Hurley, the translator of Deleuze’s Spinoza text, for 
situating the subject in experiences.      
        We will briefly look at three notions, or ‘diagram’ them, in order to 
see some ramifications for Deleuze’s thought in the wake of Uexküll. First we 
will discuss an organicism that requires an immanent sense of existence (over 
transcendent qualities), then we will ‘wade into autopoiesis’, or the 
importance of immanent constructions of reality to configure how an 
organism ‘maintains itself’ in the plane of immanence, and finally suggest a 
post-phenomenological trajectory which triggers a ‘phenomenological tick’ 
when the subject is reconceived. These ‘melodies’ map nicely as starting 
points for seeing a deeper integration of, or better yet a ‘transmutation’, of 
Uexküll’s ideas, making them Deleuzian. 
What are the dangers of organicism and how does Deleuze deal with 
them? Organicism is a form of thinking that can lay a trap for 
transcendentalist thinking to re-emerge. The way Deleuze avoids the danger 
of organicism sliding into totalitarianism is through a differentiation between 
a transcendent and an immanent sense of the term plan. A transcendent plan 
gives genetic and structural guidance to the development of forms from the 
outside, such as “a design in the mind of a god, but also an evolution in the 
supposed depths of nature, or a society's organization of power.”80 In 
contrast, a plane of immanence is a “process of composition” that we perceive 
directly in “that which it makes perceptible to us.” “There is no longer a 
subject, but only individuating affective states of an anonymous force.”81So 
Deleuze gets his new subject and plan/plane of immanence together with 
Uexküll’s integration. 
       Deleuze’s new subject generalizes the basis for ethological analysis: 
“A body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an 
idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity.”82 The 
individual organism is in danger not just of being swallowed by a totalitarian 
unity from above, but also of being dissolved into its component element and 
processes, into the “intensive states of an anonymous force.”83 Deleuze’s 
plan/plane of immanence commences as the place for this new concept of 
subject. As Felice Cimatti states: “In order to avoid introducing any form of 
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transcendence into their onto-ethology, Deleuze and Guattari even give up on 
the unitary concept of ‘world,’ just as Uexküll teaches them to.”84 
       One problem with this Deleuzian move is that Uexküll himself 
clearly relies on the transcendent sense of Bauplan—which in Uexküll’s case 
is not merely a morphogenetic blueprint, but something like a cosmic design 
schematic that informs all of life, including the ethology of organisms. When 
Deleuze writes that Goethe is not really a Spinozist because he “never ceased 
to link the plan to the organization of a Form and to the formation of a 
Subject,”it seems that Uexküll, outside of Deleuze’s idiosyncratic reading, has 
never done away with this link either.85 The question then is how to develop 
an account of the organismic subject that opens it up to others without losing 
completely the specificity of the individual living subject and its experience 
as a level of analysis, which both ecological psychology and enactivism are 
grounded in. 
        Autopoiesis, or the description of how the processes making up a 
system interact to reproduce each other, regenerate their interrelations, and 
constitute the system as a material entity, is another possible link to Deleuze 
after Uexküll. As Cimatti confirms: “… the biologization of ontology means 
that any entity of the world is a body that is no longer taken into account as 
an ‘object’ of a certain type nor as a ‘thing’ that belongs to a specific abstract 
category. The body, each body, is nothing but its power to take part in 
connections with other bodies. In such an ontology, the ancient notion of 
‘essence’ no longer plays any role.”86 This network description matches 
directly with the Maturana & Varela hypothesis for Autopoiesis and 
Cognition.87 
        However, Pearson already picked up on the potential links between 
Deleuze and enactivism twenty years ago. His observations and intuitions 
have turned out to be prescient insofar as some of the tensions he identifies 
between Deleuze’s view of organisms and the conception of autopoiesis 
developed by Varela and Maturana have since been resolved through the 
developments of enactivism.88 Protevi likewise notes how Di Paolo’s 
emphasis on adaptivity closes part of the gap between original autopoiesis’ 
too static conception of the organism and Deleuze’s view of the organism as 
“that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself.”89 We can conclude 
by giving credit to Deleuze for thoughts which are intimately related to 
autopoiesis, but without any more works from the thinker we have to see the 
eclipse of that trajectory by enactivism. 
        Deleuze can be called post-phenomenologist90 precisely insofar as he 
decenters and dissolves the subject as the privileged locus of consciousness. 
As Cimatti corroborates: “Deleuze and Guattari generalize the case of the tick. 
The difference between the tick and humans, they argue, is not a difference 
based on their respective essences. It is rather a difference based on the 
capacity of passions only.”91 Perhaps we might say there is a ‘tick’ to 
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phenomenology when Deleuze introduced his new notion of the subject in 
experience. We have a different locus if one were to pursue a 
phenomenological investigation within the Deleuzian plane of immanence. 
        This creates a parallelism to some variants of 4E cognition and 
conversely raises the question of how those accounts that award no special 
importance to the organism over and above any other elements of a complex 
assemblage of processes, objects and entities are still able to provide an 
account of personal experience as it spans open the world of our every-day 
lives. “Deleuze contends that the 'opposition' between Bergson and 
phenomenology is a radical one in respect of the question of consciousness. 
[...] For Deleuze the nature of this opposition amounts to conceiving 
consciousness as immanent to matter, rather than bestowing upon it the 
privilege of a centered natural perception located in a subject.”92 Conceived 
in explicit contrast to phenomenology, Deleuze shows a “concern to define a 
mode of philosophy that could think beyond the human condition.”93 The 
question for us is how far beyond the human this is. Uexküll’s thought 
extends our view beyond the human towards all animals with nervous 
systems and, less explicitly, to all living beings. As Cimatti states: “In fact, the 
biological meaning is neither subjective nor objective, neither in the mind nor 
in the world. It cannot even be any of the two. Sensations are not internal signs 
of the objects of the world.”94 There seems to be a danger of expanding our 
account of mental phenomena so far that nothing can be excluded from this 
category in a principled way anymore. 
 In these integrated uses of Uexküll’s thinking we get an application of 
ideas that Deleuze / Deleuze-Guattari sought in their philosophy. As Cimatti 
states: “Deleuze and Guattari do not simply read Uexküll as a biologist, but 
they fully grasp the wider ontological implications of his approach. According 
to them, biology is much more than the science of living organisms. What 
Deleuze and Guattari see in biology is a way to redefine ontology as a 
generalized ethology.”95 In this ethology we have successfully disintegrated 
the subject-object distinction and allowed for the assemblages to form without 
subjectivities, or human anthropocentric formations to infect this new non-
subjective description of life in the world. The symphonies of nature are ‘plan-
ned’ or ‘plane-d’ with the melodies of immanence and the harmonies of 
interactions. “Whereas Uexküll gives us a biological theory of life, Deleuze 
and Guattari develop it and transform it into an onto-ethological theory of 
reality. In other words, they extend Uexküll’s theory of biological ‘meaning’ 
to the entire reality, be it natural or artificial. In this sense, they chase Uexküll’s 
original goal even more faithfully than him.”96 Umwelt then, was not simply 
a concept used by Deleuze / Deleuze-Guattari, but absorbed into the 
application of their thinking to redefine experience in general and formulated 
anew as a philosophy of immanence from which we can proceed into new 
realms of being ‘animals’ without transcendent baggage of ‘human-ness.’ 
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Uexküll in France and the Enactive-Ecological Approach 
We have seen that there is a rich history of Uexküll reception within 
French philosophy and its engagements with living beings and their 
experience. On the topic of subjective experience, these discussions often orbit 
around phenomenology, sometimes approaching or even transgressing the 
limits of what can be called phenomenology, or what can be called a subject. 
Canguilhem, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze share a fascination with Uexküll’s 
thought and deploy his concept of Umwelt in related ways to explore the 
experience of living beings. At the same time, their readings of Uexküll 
remain clearly distinct, and their relationships to phenomenology are quite 
different from each other. Canguilhem and Merleau-Ponty use Uexüll to think 
about the nature of life and mind, but according to Foucault do so from two 
sides of a separating line: “It is the line that separates a philosophy of 
experience, of sense and of subject and a philosophy of knowledge, of 
rationality and of concept. On the one hand, one network is that of Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty; and then another is that of Cavailles, Bachelard and 
Canguilhem.”97 Deleuze’s reception of Uexküll is strongly shaped by his 
reading of Spinoza, which can be understood as part of a larger conflict 
between French 20th century Spinozism and phenomenology.98 Yet despite 
their different approaches to the study of experience, they each find in 
Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt an important resource for their thought. 
We can draw a valuable lesson from the heterogeneity of Uexküll’s 
reception in France: The concept of Umwelt can be deployed in different ways 
that modulate the ways it functions in different systems of thought. This 
unusual degree in conceptual plasticity is both a challenge and a chance for 
the ecological-enactive approach. It is crucial to be explicit and precise about 
the exact philosophical commitments that any specific application of Umwelt 
entails. On the other hand, it is possible to use Umwelt in different ways that 
make it amenable to a variety of different philosophical projects. For the 
ecological-enactive approach, it is particularly interesting to note the ways in 
which Uexküll’s thought is employed at crucial junctures to ward off dangers 
and enemies: Umwelt helps us defend—with Canguilhem and Merleau-
Ponty—against idealism and human exceptionalism. At the same time, we 
also have to be on guard—with Deleuze—against Uexküll himself and the 
totalitarian threat of organicism mutating into a political and social 
nightmare.    
To the degree that this epithet is justified, the French Uexküllians 
discussed here all grapple with the question of how to think about the living 
at the intersection of philosophy and the natural sciences. Like in Uexküll’s 
work, philosophical concepts rooted in German idealist and romanticist 
thought often do the work of synthesizing scientific accounts of various 
biological phenomena and filling in some of the gaps. The project of aligning 
the enactive and ecological approaches within the philosophy of embodied 
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cognition is remarkably similar in some ways, but contains an added 
challenge: Uexküll’s central notions are drawn not just from a kind of Kantian 
constructivism, but also from Goethe’s Naturphilosophie and neo-vitalism, and 
especially the latter two are not immediately compatible with the existing 
paradigm(s) or episteme(s) of cognitive science. They are not merely 
marginal, but are not even available positions: both cognitivist orthodoxy and 
the variety embodied approaches challenging it are united in excluding them 
from the discussion.  
The way to deal with this situation productively is first to stop treating 
the historical role of philosophy in biological thought as something shameful, 
but as a central and productive force of its development.99 Vitalists did not 
suffer from some personal weakness for esotericism or an emotional inability 
to stomach the sober truth of materialism. Their reductionist 
contemporaries—more respectable as scientists to our historical gaze—often 
had real problems explaining certain phenomena of life, and their heirs still 
have them today. Canguilhem and Merleau-Ponty were both very interested 
in, and sympathetic towards, vitalism and their fascination with Uexküll’s 
work was not unrelated to this. Once we stop treating the role of philosophy 
in the history of science as a series of youthful indiscretions, we can also begin 
to look for more naturalistic modern solutions to the same problems. The 
enactivist project of replacing Kant’s Naturzwecke as a regulative ideal with a 
naturalistic account of organismic teleology is a good example of this kind of 
task. While the most popular accounts in philosophy of biology explain the 
appearance of purposive behavior by appeal to an organism’s evolutionary 
history100, enactivists grapple with the challenge of Kant’s third Critique and 
seek to explain the emergence of immanent teleology from the complex 
dynamics of organismic closure.101   
Performing a similar move for the concept of Umwelt could yield a new 
conception of environment that does the same philosophical job while also 
being compatible with the scientific ontologies of both ecological psychology 
and enactivism. To some degree, recent engagement with Umwelt by both 
ecological psychologists102 and enactivists103 constitutes the beginning of this 
project. However, the role that Uexküll’s thought plays in both approaches is 
still sometimes problematic and will require further development.104 When 
Di Paolo states that “Umwelten have open horizons”,105 it is not quite clear 
how this enactivist reading meshes with Uexküll’s own account. In a section 
devoted to the horizon, or “farthest plane”106, Uexküll emphasizes how the 
horizon of each animal forms its Umwelt as a “soap bubble around them, 
closed on all sides, which closes off their visual space and in which everything 
visible for the subject is also enclosed”107. Uexküll clearly speaks of closure, 
where Di Paolo and Merleau-Ponty speak of openness. For Di Paolo, Umwelt 
is open because it is “self-contradictory as well as unified”, while Merleau-
Ponty describes the openness of Umwelt as a “militant finitude”108 in an 
equally contradictory manner. If contradiction is meant to function here in the 
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dialectical sense as part of an explanation, it will have to be embedded more 
firmly in the general account of dialectics as a method of cognitive science that 
is starting to take shape.109 
 Like Umwelt, the musical theory of meaning that Uexküll outlined in 
Bedeutungslehre poses conceptual problems when we try to introduce it into 
the philosophy of embodied cognition110—and these problems are already 
familiar from the French reception of Uexküll. In his discussion of Merleau-
Ponty’s later work, Buchanan asks: “how can the cohesive relation, this 
‘prelogical bond’ between living bodies and things, not be implicated in an 
organic or vitalist model that presupposes an all-encompassing unity that 
Merleau-Ponty ultimately does not wish to uphold?”111 This is precisely the 
question that we need to ask when Turvey and Fultot employ Uexküll’s 
Bedeutungslehre, so heavily inundated with Goethean holism, to characterize 
the meaningful fit in the relationships between animals and their 
environments in the ecological approach. Fultot and Turvey think that they 
can avoid these implications and Buchanan thinks the same of Merleau-
Ponty’s use of Uexküll’s musical metaphor of meaning: “melody seems to 
swell up through living beings without any voluntary or determinist 
implications, nor […] a higher reality […] associated with pantheism or 
Naturphilosophie.”112 But it is not obvious how an Uexküllian account would 
function once it is shorn of its romanticist, holist, and vitalist underpinnings. 
 Interestingly, Shaun Gallagher has suggested that “enactivism involves 
not only a rethinking of the nature of mind and brain, but also a rethinking of 
the concept of nature itself.”113 This is part of Gallagher’s reading of 
enactivism as a philosophy of nature more than a scientific research project, a 
discussion in which holism also plays an important role. Holism is a problem 
for conducting experiments, but “in the context of a philosophy of nature 
meant to offer an encompassing view, holism is a strength rather than a 
practical complication.”114 It will be interesting to see how the development 
of an ecological-enactive approach deals with this task of rethinking the 
concept of nature in a holistic manner. Enactivism has incorporated a sincere 
interest in continental philosophy from its beginnings and is continuously 
broadening the scope of its search for philosophical allies. In this, enactivism 
seems to parallel the realization in biophilosophy that we will not understand 
nature by limiting our investigation to one single, narrow way of doing 
philosophy.115 Along with a wider philosophical toolbox, these developments 
in the philosophy of embodied cognition also create the need for a careful 
translation of concepts between different domains.  
Part of this work involves clarifying what exactly the philosophical role 
of Umwelt has been historically, and what it can be in the present debates 
within embodied cognition. We hope that this analysis of Uexküll’s reception 
in France provides useful starting points for more research on the place of 
Umwelt at the intersection between biology, psychology, and 
phenomenology. Rather than provide simple answers, the intricate 
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connections we have begun to trace deepen our appreciation for the 
complexity of the problem, just as they provide us with new resources to 
address our challenge. If our analysis so far fails to yield ready-made recipes 
for applying one or another concept from continental philosophy to cognitive 
science, this is in accord with our conviction that the relocation of a concept 
from one philosophical milieu to another is a delicate process and requires 
slow and careful work to succeed. Just as Merleau-Ponty’s late work remains 
unfinished, important conceptual work here still remains to be done. 
In its search for a unified philosophical framework, the ecological-
enactive approach encounters the same situation that Canguilhem, Merleau-
Ponty, and Deleuze grappled with: The questions of what life and mind are 
reveal themselves to be deeply intertwined with the question of what the 
world is. It is here that Uexküll’s thought is most useful to us today—not by 
providing answers, but by allowing us to address traditional philosophical 
problems in slightly different ways. With Uexküll we go on forays into the 
conceptual landscape, straying off the well-worn paths of inquiry to look for 
novel and strange questions in the underbrush. 
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